The passing away of Field Marshal Sam "Bahadur" Manekshaw on June 27 marks the end of an era. Sam was not only independent India’s most successful Army Chief, but was also the last "top link" of the brief period of revival in India’s strategic culture under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. In all fairness, there was another briefer period of realpolitik in 1947-48, when "Iron Man" Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel unified India. The Kashmir problem would have been solved permanently had the government heeded the advice of then Maj. Gen. K.S. Thimmaiya and allowed the Army another fortnight to clear out the Pakistani raiders from what is now Occupied Kashmir.
All Indians are aware of the Chinese obsession with Arunachal Pradesh and the Pakistani obsession with Kashmir. Few, however, are aware that in addition to the illegal occupation of Aksai Chin (38,000 sq.km), China has additional claims in areas of Uttarakhand (1,818 sq.km) and Himachal Pradesh (303 sq.km). Thus, at its convenience, China can choose to "reactivate" tensions along the entire northern border, or lull our politico-bureaucratic setup with "sweet talk". While the commonly-held view is that China will not open a second front against India till it resolves the Taiwanese problem, it would be prudent to be prepared, especially given India’s tragic history of being surprised due to a lack of strategic culture. In any case, India can safely assume that China will continue to "blow hot, blow cold" till it is confronted with a decisive Indian political leadership, backed by conventional and strategic military deterrence capability.
In 1980, then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi approved a 15-year plan to upgrade defence along India’s entire 4,056-km northern border with China. This was indeed a very good decision as in 1986-87 China tested India’s resolve in the Sumdorong Chu faceoff in Arunachal Pradesh. Here, some six well-equipped Indian mountain divisions faced an equal number of Chinese troops. Realising that they lacked overwhelming advantage — military and infrastructure — the Chinese blinked first. However, they waited for the right time to hoodwink India with sweet talk.
Mrs Indira Gandhi was assassinated in 1984. In 1989, Pakistan-backed insurgency started in Kashmir. The Soviet Union broke up in 1991, and along with the loss of this strategic partner (Mrs Indira Gandhi had signed the Indo-Soviet Treaty in 1971 to offset any American or Chinese pressure) and low-cost supplier of military hardware, India faced a severe economic crisis. This led, once again, to the downgradation of the military. Mrs Gandhi’s 15-year plan of defence upgrade was abandoned and no funds were spared for uranium mining. The border peace and tranquillity agreement with China was signed in 1993.
While India forbade any development activity on its side of the border (some airfields became non-operational due to neglect), China utilised the next 10 years in settling land-border disputes with its neighbours (except India), provided large-scale military and economic assistance to Pakistan along with nuclear weapons and delivery systems and built up infrastructure for effective border management with India. India, in keeping with its naïveté, lapped up the Chinese talk about "a border agreement without populated areas", verbally accepting that "Sikkim is a part of India" etc. In 1998, India conducted its second series of nuclear tests, and like the first test in 1974, shied away from fully testing another device despite the window of opportunity created by Pakistan’s tit-for-tat tests of a proven Chinese weapon two weeks later. Worse still, India declared a voluntary moratorium on further testing. In 2003, India formally threw away its last bargaining chip by agreeing to the Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. India’s politico-bureaucratic security setup was suddenly faced with hundreds of border incursions. India has now (belatedly) begun to build up infrastructure and its military capabilities. It is still some 10 years behind China.
Well aware of its present military and economic lead, and India’s preoccupations — with Pakistan, jihadi strikes in the hinterland and internal coalition politics, which prevent strategic decisionmaking — China has done what it does best: combine sweet-talk with a steel fist to keep India guessing.
The signs are ominous given that the incursions are continuing despite China’s preoccupation with the earthquake rehabilitation work and the Beijing Olympics. Similarly, Pakistan, despite its preoccupation on the western front, has breached the four-year ceasefire more than once.
By September 2008, Beijing would be "free" from its Olympics duties and will be able to concentrate fully on India. At the same time, Pakistan (and the jihadi elements) too would be tempted to cause mischief before the Kashmir elections in October.
So what can India do to deal with the three immediate threats — China, Pakistan and the terrorists?
It is clear that trying to please China has failed. Our enemies will only respect a strong and decisive Indian government. In the next five years, India has to solve its hardware and manpower problems. In my opinion, the Army urgently requires modern artillery and much more than the two new mountain divisions planned (as per press reports). The IAF too requires twice the number of the 126 MMRCA jets planned, and the Navy needs to import a squadron each of modern, multi-role submarines and corvettes.
On the strategic front, the answer with regards to first and second-strike capability is obvious: India needs operational versions of the proposed Agni-5, ICBM and the proposed new indigenous ABM system at the earliest. Our immediate stockpile of nuclear weapons and delivery systems need to be well above the three-figure mark. There is also a need for our DRDO scientists to stop making statements and deliver "real systems" instead of having "items under trial" for decades or promising "technology demonstrators".
Here are a few measures the Government of India should take before September 2008:
l Institutionalise India’s defence and strategic posture by fully integrating the three service headquarters with the ministry of defence. This induction of "vertical specialisation," should ensure that we do not suffer anymore tactical or strategic surprises.
l Create a modified version of the CDS with a separate budget for acquisitions and maintenance. This newly-created four star officer, could initially be the single point of advise to the government only for the use of strategic weapons and out of area contingencies. The present IDS HQ, Strategic Forces Command and the Andaman-Nicobar Command can come directly under him. Subsequently, by 2012, his role can be reassessed, and enlarged if necessary.
l Reassess India’s "no first use" policy with regards to nuclear weapons. This is to cater for specific contingencies.
l Secure a part of our energy requirements by signing the India-Pakistan-Iran gas pipeline deal.
l Use the strategically-located Andaman and Nicobar Islands as "unsinkable aircraft carriers" by basing fighter and long-range maritime patrol aircraft there. Assure all friendly countries that these are purely defensive measures.
l Provide the military, civil intelligence agencies and counter terrorist forces with the necessary manpower and latest weapons.
l Take a quick "yes or no" decision on the Indo-US nuclear deal. A country of India’s size, population and growing economy should not cut a sorry figure by "sitting on the fence" on most issues. In this case, the deal will make little difference economically (it will contribute only six to eight per cent to the national power grid over the next century) or even politically (because India will have to "test" sooner than later).
l Review the defence budget which (as per the Army Chief and media reports), has fallen to 1.98 per cent of the GDP (the lowest since 1962) taking 11.5 per cent inflation into account.
l Take a good hard look at the Rs 60,000-crore farm loan waiver and the Sixth Pay Commission recommendations, which combined amount to 10 per cent of the GDP. With the Indian economy in a tailspin due to rising oil prices and domestic populist policies, its growth rate may fall to 6.5 per cent. As per a recent Goldman & Sachs report, India is placed last in the BRIC economies. In my opinion, the root cause of discontent among government employees is the disproportionate hike given to the IAS community by the Pay Commission. A simpler and more cost-effective solution would be to reduce the number of IAS officers (from its present 225 to 35 secretaries, as it was in 1981) and amend the newly-introduced 14-year promotion rule for joint secretaries and make it 21 years (only two per cent of defence personnel reach equivalent rank in over 28 years) while upgrading the armed forces, police and paramilitary.
While the above proposals would contribute towards reviving India’s strategic culture, I think two more gestures are needed. The first is to set up a National War Memorial. The second is to posthumously award the Bharat Ratna to Sam Manekshaw, so that the present list of 37 (which includes 25 politicians and five artistes) has at least one deserving soldier.
— Vice-Admiral Arun Kumar Singh retired as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command, Visakhapatnam
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